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The Policy-Practice Divide and SME-friendly Public Procurement  
Anthony Flynn and Paul Davis 
Business School, Dublin City University (DCU), Ireland  
Abstract 
Policies aimed at supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are now standard in 
public procurement. Interest in these policies has yet to be matched by evidence on their 
implementation. Using an institutional perspective, we examine the extent to which public 
buyers have complied with SME-friendly policy recommendations. The results, which are based 
on the self-reported behaviours of 436 respondents, show that public buyers are complying with 
some but not all policy measures. Compliance is high on measures including open tendering, 
provision of feedback, and self-declaring financial capacity but low on measures which impose 
higher transaction costs, such as dividing contracts into lots and encouraging consortium bidding. 
Further analysis reveals that involvement in procurement, policy familiarity, and perceived 
importance of SME access act as positive predictors of compliance; being part of a semi-
state/utility company, local authority or education institution has the opposite effect. Possibilities 
to increase compliance and bring about a more SME-friendly tendering system are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed various lines of inquiry opening up at the intersection of SMEs and 
public procurement. Among these has been debate over what policy actions governments should 
take to facilitate SME access to public procurement. Loader (2013) recently undertook a 
comprehensive review of the evidence in this area. She concluded that the literature has been 
dominated by two streams: discussion and empirical findings on the barriers experienced by 
SMEs when tendering and proposed policy solutions to these same barriers. An area which has 
received far less attention is compliance with SME-friendly policy. In spite of the presence of 
SME-friendly policy in most jurisdictions as well as increasing scholarly interest in the benefits 
and limitations of such policy, there has been little attempt to investigate whether public buyers 
have complied with it. This is a significant omission because it is what happens in practice that 
affects SMEs’ likelihood of competing for and winning public sector contracts, not what is 
contained in policy statements (Fee et al., 2002). We should not assume that because something 
is articulated by elected representatives and codified in policy means that it will become a reality 
in everyday procurement (Murray, 2012). Proposing solutions to SME problems is relatively 
straightforward. It is getting these solutions implemented that poses the real challenge (Bennett, 
2008).   
 
The importance of public buyers responding positively to SME-friendly policy cannot be 
overstated. Research undertaken across a number of jurisdictions has captured SMEs’ 
frustrations with perceived bureaucracy and anti-competitive practices in public sector tendering 
(Fee et al., 2002; Greer, 1999; MacManus, 1991). At the same time it is known that SMEs are 
eager to do business with public sector organisations, place a high premium on public sector 
contracts, and recognise the opportunities that come from involvement in public sector supply 
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chains (Bovis, 1996; Loader, 2005). Policies have been rolled out with increasing frequency to 
address this problem and ensure that a level playing field exists on which suppliers of all sizes 
can compete (Kidalov and Snider, 2011). The goal of these policies is to make it easier for SMEs 
to search, bid for and win public sector contracts. As policy implementers public buyers are 
critical to achieving this goal (Beyer et al., 1983). Their behaviour acts as a significant 
determinant of how accessible public procurement is for SMEs in the first place and, after that, 
the likelihood of them securing public contracts. In particular, public buyer compliance with 
SME-friendly policy suggests progress towards a procurement system in which the potential of 
the SME population is fully exploited. On the other hand, non-compliance implies a persistence 
of the status quo. 
 
Research on other aspects of public procurement has found that public buyers and their 
organisations have either been unwilling or unable to fully translate policy into practice. For 
example, several studies have detected non-compliance by public buyers with European Union 
(EU) Procurement Directives (Gelderman et al., 2006; Martin et al., 1999). Gaps between policy 
and practice in environmentally sustainable procurement have also been highlighted by 
Coggburn and Rahm (2005), Morgan (2008), Preuss (2007), Thomson and Jackson (2007) and 
Walker and Brammer (2009). In much the same way Murray (2011) observed that policies 
designed to increase public sector engagement with not-for-profit suppliers have largely failed to 
translate into practice. Perhaps most noteworthy is data from the United States indicating that 
federal agencies have consistently fallen short on their targets for the number and value of 
contracts to be awarded to SMEs (Clark and Moutray, 2004). ‘Implementation deficits’ have also 
been identified outside public procurement in areas including climate protection (Jordan, 1999; 
Krause, 2011; Pitt, 2010), waste management (Nilsson et al., 2009) and rural planning (Gilg and 
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Kelly, 1997). Most recently, Randhawa and Marshall’s (2014) case study of an Indian water 
management project demonstrated how implementation practices often end up bearing little 
resemblance to what is contained in government action plans. Evidently, there is nothing 
inevitable about policy translating into practice, whether in procurement or in any other domain.   
 
The question here is whether a policy-practice divide characterises SME-friendly procurement. A 
traditional institutional perspective assumes that policy determines practice (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966). More recent perspectives challenge this view, arguing that institutional 
pressures are not always deterministic and compliance is never guaranteed (Oliver, 1991). The 
purpose of this inquiry is to investigate the extent to which SME-friendly procurement policy is 
eliciting compliance from public buyers. The factors that promote or inhibit policy compliance 
are also examined. To our knowledge this study represents the first systematic survey of 
compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy. A number of reasons might explain why 
evidence has not been forthcoming. Firstly, there has been a general failure on the part of policy 
makers to monitor implementation or even to set down criteria and standards against which 
procurement policy can be assessed. The result has been a lack of publicly available data for 
researchers to work with and uncertainty over how policy and its effects should be measured. 
Compounding this problem is the challenge facing researchers when trying to access the public 
buyer population. Many organisations do not have a dedicated purchasing officer or purchasing 
unit but instead delegate responsibility to a number of individuals whose primary role is not 
procurement. The dearth of quantitative data on SME-friendly procurement practices also 
appears to be part of a wider issue of management scholars not paying sufficient attention to the 
impact of policies on SMEs (Mason, 2009).  
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The paper is structured as follows. The next section deals with an emergent SME-public 
procurement nexus and the role of policy therein. This is followed by an examination of SME-
friendly policy as an institutional pressure bearing on public buyers and their likely response to 
it. Thereafter, a description is given of the design and execution of the research, including: 
measuring policy compliance, predictors of compliance, data collection, response rate, 
representativeness of respondents, and characteristics of respondents. Findings as they relate to 
the extent of policy compliance among public buyers and the factors predicting compliance are 
then set out. The final section of the paper discusses the contribution of the research and ways 
through which compliance can be improved.  
Public Procurement and SMEs 
Public procurement makes up a significant part of the economy. Across OECD countries it 
accounts for, on average, 12.8% of GDP and 29% of total government expenditure (OECD, 
2013). At various times over the last century the economic weight of public procurement has 
been leveraged to support goals seemingly unconnected to purchasing, such as the promotion of 
civil rights and minority inclusion (McCrudden, 2007). This trend has continued to the present 
day. In addition to its primary goal of securing supplies and services at the most economically 
advantageous terms, public procurement is associated with an array of ‘horizontal policies’ 
(Arrowsmith, 2010). Indicative of these ‘horizontal policies’, since 2008 the European 
Commission has issued procurement guidelines relating to SMEs, social inclusion, 
environmental protection and innovation. In turn, these policies and norms have percolated down 
to EU Member States. Ireland, for example, has integrated its procurement policy with SME 
growth, innovation and environmental sustainability in recent years (Department of Finance, 
2010) and the UK’s Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012 requires public buyers to consider 
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the economic, social and environmental implications of their procurement decisions (HM 
Government, 2014).    
 
It is in relation to SMEs that procurement as a policy lever has generated most interest. The 
reason for this is grounded in economic competitiveness. SMEs are now recognised as central to 
the future growth and economic prosperity of developed economies, exemplified in The Small 
Business Act for Europe and its principle of ‘think small first’ (European Commission, 2008a). 
Between 2002 and 2010 SMEs were responsible for creating 85% of new jobs across Europe 
(EIM, 2011). Yet as the same study pointed out, SMEs are more vulnerable than large firms 
during economic downturns. To underpin their competitiveness and ensure their full economic 
potential is realised, policy makers have become increasingly proactive in supporting small firms 
(Smallbone et al., 2002; Williams, 2013). Public procurement is viewed as key to this strategy of 
SME-led growth (Preuss, 2011). The public sector marketplace offers SMEs opportunities for 
growth and professionalization; and public sector contracts come with the advantages of payment 
certainty, reputation enhancement through contracting with large public sector organisations, and 
the possibility of fostering long-term commercial relationships (Bovis, 1996; Loader, 2005; 
Withey, 2011). Nor is the relationship one way. The public sector and, by extension, the delivery 
of public services stands to gain from the entrepreneurship, flexibility and customer 
responsiveness that characterise many small suppliers (Woldesenbet et al., 2012).  
For all the above, public procurement presents major challenges for SMEs. Research has shown 
that suppliers view the tendering process negatively (MacManus, 1991) and perceive greater 
value benefits from supplying private firms than public sector organisations (Purchase et al., 
2009). Frequently documented SME criticisms include excessive bureaucracy and too much 
weighting on cost (Cabras, 2011), difficulties with identifying opportunities and navigating the 
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procedural aspects of tendering (Fee et al., 2002; Greer, 1999; Loader, 2005), financial and time 
demands of tendering (Flynn et al., 2013a), too large contract sizes and information asymmetries 
(Bovis, 1996; Smith and Hobbs, 2002). Added to this is evidence that small-scale suppliers often 
lack the administrative capacity and legal expertise to succeed in tendering (Karjalainen and 
Kemppainen, 2008), have fewer human resources to devote to tendering, and are less proactive 
in engaging with public buyers (Flynn et al., 2013b). The effects of these systemic barriers and 
capacity constraints are apparent in low success rates for SMEs. The most recent data available 
indicates that SMEs’ share of above EU-threshold contracts stood at 33% as against their 99.8% 
presence in the population of EU enterprises (GHK, 2010).  
Policies created for the benefit of SMEs are predicated on there being some type of market 
failure (Bennett, 2008). SME-friendly procurement policy is no exception. It attempts to address 
the under-representation of small firms in the public sector marketplace (Anglund, 1999). In a 
2012 survey of 32 OECD countries, 11 had enacted policies or made specific legislative 
provision to encourage greater SME involvement in public procurement, and only 3 countries 
had no substantive measures in place (OECD, 2013). These legislative and policy provisions 
vary in their content and objectives depending on the jurisdiction. The United States uses a mix 
of coercive and normative pressures to support SMEs in public sector tendering (Kidalov and 
Snider, 2011). In respect of the coercive dimension, federal agencies are legally obliged to 
allocate a percentage of their total procurement spend to SME suppliers, an arrangement 
overseen by the US Small Business Administration. Support for SMEs throughout the EU is 
normative in form and limited to policy guidance; legally binding Directives preclude the use of 
discriminatory practices such as set-asides for SMEs (Bovis, 1998). Consequently, policies at 
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national level throughout the EU emphasise equality of opportunity but stop short of equality of 
outcome.  
Using policy to promote SMEs’ interests in public procurement is not without its own problems. 
A number of scholars have pointed to the potential for conflict between SME-friendly 
procurement objectives and the commercial and regulatory realities facing public buyers. In this 
vein Pickernell et al., (2011, page 641) spoke of an “uneasy mixture of different policy legacies” 
characterising the public procurement environment in the UK and Schapper et al., (2006) 
identified a performance-conformance tension in the procurement function of public sector 
organisations. The tension between cost reduction targets and facilitating SME suppliers has 
received particular attention (Cabras, 2011; Erridge, 2007; Loader, 2007; Preuss, 2007; Walker 
and Brammer, 2009). Trends towards consolidated purchasing across the public sector are likely 
to amplify these tensions in the coming years (Loader, 2013; Smith and Hobbs, 2002). Notably, 
these issues have also been reported by public buyers themselves. In the US Qiao et al., (2009) 
found them to be circumspect over the intent of SME-friendly policy while their equivalents in 
the UK expressed uncertainty over how to reconcile SME-friendly policy with pressures for cost 
minimisation and adherence to EU Directives (Glover, 2008). The conclusion drawn by Loader 
was that “…while procurement officers would like to do business with small firms, in practice 
their primary aim is to achieve value for money” (2007, page 313).  
An institutional perspective on SME-friendly procurement 
To gain a more theoretically-informed understanding of public buyers’ responses to SME-
friendly procurement an institutional perspective is used here. This models SME-friendly policy 
as an institutional pressure bearing on public buyers and their organisations. The policy itself 
comprises one part of the institutional ‘rules of the game’ laid down by the state, which proscribe 
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some courses of action while actively promoting other courses of action (Jepperson, 1991). 
Individuals are said to signal their compliance with institutional rules out of concern for their 
social legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). Legitimacy is achieved and maintained by 
behaving in a way that is “….desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995, page 574). To openly 
contravene institutional rules is to jeopardise legitimacy and possibly incur sanctions from the 
institutional rule setters (Meyer, 1979). The importance of social legitimacy notwithstanding, 
individuals do not always comply with the rules, whether by choice or by necessity. As 
institutional theorists have discovered, gaps invariably open up between abstract institutional 
templates and the daily demands of organisational life (Barley, 1986).   
 
Traditionally, institutional pressures were understood as “given, unalterable, and self-evident” 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966, page 56). As far as individual and organisational behaviour was 
concerned, institutions had the status of social facts and had to be complied with on this basis 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977). More recent perspectives offer a qualified take on institutional 
determinism. Firstly, they reason that the ability of institutions to determine the behaviour of 
individuals depends on their being consensus and clarity around the ‘rules of the game’ or a 
sense of institutional balance (Rowan, 1982). Without this institutional balance, and where 
multiple and competing institutional forces are at play, the ability and willingness of actors to 
show compliance is reduced (D’aunno et al., 1991). The second proviso relates to interest and 
agency on the part of individuals subject to institutional pressures (DiMaggio, 1988). There is 
now acceptance that, to varying degrees, actors are able to exercise choice over how they 
respond to institutional pressures, which includes not only compliance but also compromise, 
avoidance and outright defiance (Oliver, 1991). As a recent example of this, Vega et al., (2013) 
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reported how officials were able to exercise informal discretion over the implementation of 
enterprise policy in spite of procedures in place to govern their behaviour.  
The extent to which institutional pressures determine actor behaviour depends on a number of 
factors (Oliver, 1991). Among these are questions over: why the organisation is being pressured 
to conform to institutional rules? Who is exerting the institutional pressure? And by what means 
are institutional pressures being exerted? When these questions are asked of SME-friendly 
procurement, it is clear that there are pressures for and against compliance. Pressures for 
compliance include the high level of social legitimacy that can accrue to public buyers by 
engaging with SME suppliers, the consistency of the SME-friendly procurement agenda with the 
goals of public sector organisations, and the dependency of public sector organisations on the 
state for their continued existence. Acting against these pro-compliance pressures are the 
previously referred to tensions within the institutional ‘rules of the game’ for public 
procurement, the normative as opposed to coercive nature of SME-friendly policy (Kidalov and 
Snider, 2011), and the constraints SME-friendly policy imposes on public buyers’ discretion. 
Weighing up these opposing forces, it seems unlikely that SME-friendly policy will be fully 
deterministic of public buyer behaviour. At an individual level buyers could find themselves 
either unable or unwilling to exhibit the level of compliance envisaged by policy makers.  
Research design  
An index comprising ten individual support measures is used to examine SME-friendly 
procurement by public buyers (table 1). These measures are adapted from Irish government 
policy on facilitating SME involvement in public procurement (Department of Finance, 2010). 
Irish policy is derived from the European Code of Best Practices Facilitating Access by SMEs to 
Public Procurement Contracts (European Commission, 2008b). As such, the individual measures 
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and the index itself typify efforts at EU level and across Member States to address barriers 
experienced by SMEs when tendering for public sector contracts. Individually and collectively 
these measures are aimed at increasing SMEs participation and success rates in public 
procurement by helping them to overcome difficulties relating to too large contract sizes; 
widening access to available opportunities; alleviating the administrative burden; easing 
eligibility criteria; and addressing information asymmetries among tenderers. Individual 
measures are scored either 0 or 1 depending on public buyers’ self-reported behaviours: 0 if the 
measure is not implemented and 1 if the measure is implemented. Measures 1,2,8,9 and 10, as 
numbered in table 1, allow for a score of .50, which denotes partial implementation. These 
measures are articulated in policy in such a way as to leave open the possibility that compliance 
could be one of degree. 
 
Two of the measures that comprise the index are given a double weighting: dividing contracts 
into lots and encouraging SME consortium bids. The former aims to reduce contract size to 
match SMEs’ capabilities while the latter aims to increase SMEs’ capabilities to match contract 
size (European Commission, 2008b). This approach is justified on the following basis. The 
available evidence shows that contract size is commonly regarded as the main impediment to 
SME involvement in public procurement (Loader, 2013). It follows that measures directly 
addressing the problem of contract size are likely to have a greater impact than other measures. 
In line with best practice recommendations (Hsu et al., 2013), input from a select group of 
experienced public buyers was also obtained. The consensus view of this group was that 
measures addressing contract size should have the most salutary effect on SME involvement. 
Furthermore, their recommendation was for the two measures to be double weighted. 
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Equivalence of impact is assumed for the other eight support measures. The result is a ten-item 
index of SME-friendly procurement that is scaled 0-12.   
Table 1 Index of SME-friendly procurement  
Overcoming difficulties relating to too large contract size 
Measure 1: Divide contracts into lots where appropriate and practical and without compromising 
efficiency and value for money 
Measure 2: Show openness to SME consortium bidding by, for example, drawing attention to 
this possibility in the contract notice or publishing prior information notices 
Widening access to opportunities 
Measure 3: Follow open tendering procedures in the case of contracts for supplies & services up 
to €125,000  (i.e. no pre-qualification before submission of tenders)  
Measure 4: Follow open tendering procedures in the case of contracts for works & related 
services up to €250,000 (i.e. no pre-qualification before submission of tenders)   
Alleviating the administrative burden 
Measure 5: Allow applicants to self-declare their financial capacity and seek evidence of same in 
the event of applicant being short-listed 
Measure 6: Allow applicants to self-declare their insurance cover and seek evidence of same in 
the event of applicant being short-listed 
Measure 7: Use standard documentation and tender templates  
Easing eligibility criteria 
Measure 8: Be flexible over the type of proof of financial capacity that applicants can provide  
Measure 9: Ensure that financial capacity levels and insurance requirements are relevant and 
proportionate to the circumstances of the contract    
Addressing information asymmetries  
Measure 10: Constructively de-brief unsuccessful bidders in line with current policy and their 
obligations under the EU Remedies Directive 2007/66/EC 
 
Predictor variables 
Predictors of compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy are also examined as part of 
this study. As with public buyers’ compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy generally, 
survey-based evidence has yet to be put forward on the factors that promote or inhibit 
compliance. In total 12 variables are tested against the index of SME-friendly procurement (see 
appendix). Seven of these variables relate to the characteristics of public buyers: procurement 
experience; procurement qualification; procurement training; policy familiarity; perceived 
importance of SME access; involvement in procurement; and occupational group. In respect of 
the first of these variables, the assumption is that more experienced public buyers have the skills 
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and confidence to act on new policy recommendations. A procurement qualification is taken to 
denote public buyer professionalism. Several studies have linked professionalism to increased 
compliance in procurement activity (de Boer and Telgen, 1998; Glover, 2008). Conversely, low 
levels of purchasing professionalism have been associated with non-compliance. Morgan (2008), 
for example, highlighted under-developed skill-sets among public buyers as the reason for 
sustainable procurement policy not translating into practice. It has also been noted that less 
qualified public buyers are more likely to deviate from standard procedures and engage in 
maverick buying (Karjalainen et al., 2009).         
 
Training in procurement is believed to promote policy compliance. Training can educate public 
buyers about policy expectations and raise awareness over what actions they should take to 
translate these same expectations into practice (Coggburn and Rahm, 2005; Mwakibinga and 
Buvik, 2013). Familiarity with SME-friendly policy is also taken to be linked to compliance. 
Gelderman et al., (2006) showed that familiarity with EU Procurement Directives was related to 
regulatory compliance. Lack of familiarity with policies and regulations can yield the opposite 
effect. Surveyed about barriers to acting on environmentally sustainable procurement policy, 
public buyers in the US cited lack of awareness as the main impediment (NIGP, 2001). 
Perceived importance of SME access to public procurement among public buyers is also 
considered to promote compliance. So too is involvement in procurement. It is reasoned that the 
greater the involvement in procurement the more time, motivation and career interest public 
buyers have in acting on SME-friendly policy recommendations. Supportive of this prediction, 
Pitt (2010) showed that having an employee specifically assigned to climate planning had a 
positive impact on policy adoption while Preuss (2011) concluded that reliance on ‘devolved 
buyers’ was not conducive to getting procurement policy implemented. For similar reasons 
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occupational group is tested. Compared to dedicated procurers, public buyers belonging to other 
occupational categories are assumed to have less motivation and interest in complying with 
SME-friendly policy. 
 
Five organisation variables are also tested. These are public sector organisation type, level of 
service provision, organisation size, centralisation of procurement, and category management. 
Organisation type is understood to be important as regards the range of opportunities available to 
SME suppliers. Local authorities, in particular, are more inclined to embrace the socio-economic 
dimension of public procurement, which includes contracting with SME suppliers (Walker and 
Brammer, 2009). Tangential to this is the geographic level of an organisation’s operations - 
local, regional, or national. Analysis of the UK public procurement market by Pickernell et al., 
(2011) found that small, locally focused firms were more likely to find business opportunities 
with local sources of public sector demand. This would suggest that organisations operating at 
the local level are more receptive to SME suppliers. As in other studies of policy implementation 
(e.g. Krause, 2011) larger organisations are expected to be better resourced to manage and 
comply with new policies. Finally, having a centralised procurement system is assumed to be 
conducive to getting policy implemented on account of greater control over procurement. A 
similar logic applies to organisations that manage procurement by category.   
Data collection 
Data from the Irish public sector is used to investigate compliance with SME-friendly 
procurement policy. In February, 2013 an electronic questionnaire was distributed to all public 
sector employees registered on Ireland’s national e-procurement portal, eTenders,. A reminder 
email with an embedded questionnaire link was sent out 1 week after the initial mailing. The 
questionnaire instrument conformed to best practice recommendations set out by Dillman (2007) 
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in terms of its length, design and user-friendliness. The questionnaire was pre-tested with five 
experienced public buyers and found to be acceptable, allowing for minor revisions to 
terminology and sentence structure. Ireland provides an interesting context in which to examine 
SME-friendly procurement. SMEs have become central to public procurement discourse in 
Ireland, mainly owing to the effects of an unprecedented period of recession. Between 2007 and 
2010 employment in Irish SMEs fell by 15%, final output decreased by 18% and overall 
economic contribution went from 53% to 48% (European Commission, 2013). Efforts to 
leverage public procurement for the benefit of SMEs were re-doubled as a result. This 
culminated in Facilitating SME Access to Public Sector Contracts, which was adopted as official 
state policy in August, 2010 (Department of Finance, 2010). It makes SME access an explicit 
consideration in public procurement and creates a new set of institutional pressures for public 
buyers to manage. Approximately 30 months had elapsed between the adoption of SME-friendly 
policy in Ireland and our testing of it.     
Response rate   
Seven hundred and seventy-six responses (776) were received from the 40001 public sector 
employees registered on eTenders and who received the e-questionnaire. This yielded a response 
rate of 19.4%. All responses were screened prior to conducting statistical analysis. Of these, 67 
had no role in procurement and were eliminated on this basis. Thereafter, 273 substantially 
incomplete responses were eliminated. A response was deemed incomplete if questions on 
compliance with SME-friendly procurement measures were not answered. The final number of 
usable responses was 436.  
                                                          
1 The National Procurement Service of Ireland confirmed that 4000 individuals were registered on eTenders at the 
time of the survey taking place.  
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Respondent representativeness  
The extrapolation method is used here to test for non-respondent bias (Armstrong and Overton, 
1977). Extrapolation assumes that late respondents can be used as proxies for non-respondents 
on the basis that the same reasons that explain non-response also explain late response. By 
comparing early and late respondents it becomes possible to infer if the respondent sample is 
representative of the population from which it was drawn. A lack of available population data 
ruled out the use of other representativeness tests, such as comparing respondents against known 
population characteristics for public buyers. The first 100 respondents constitute ‘early 
respondents’. They completed the questionnaire within 24 hours of receiving it. The last 100 
respondents constitute ‘late respondents’. They took between 7 and 19 days to submit their 
response and then only after receiving a reminder email notification. Independent sample t-
testing reveals no statistically significant differences between early and late respondents on five 
of the six variables tested (table 2). The one exception is perceived importance of SME access to 
public sector contracts. On this variable late respondents have higher scores than early 
respondents. Overall, the results instil a degree of confidence that public buyers who volunteered 
their answers are representative of the population.   
Table 2 Early versus late respondents 
Variable Sig. (2-tailed) 
Experience in procurement .428 
Involvement in procurement .840 
Perceived importance of SME access .003 
SME-friendly policy compliance .282 
Organisation size .221 
Level of service provision .815 
Equal variances assumed in all cases  
Respondents 
The characteristics of the 436 public buyer respondents and their organisations are as follows 
(see appendix for full profile). Indicated by their occupational groups, procurement is the 
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responsibility not only of procurers but also specific professions, executive officers, managers, 
and other occupational groups. Related to this is the finding that only 12.8% are exclusively 
employed as procurers. Average procurement experience is 12 years (std. dev. 7.7). Less than 
one in three has a procurement qualification, just over half have completed some type of 
procurement-related training and 71% are familiar with SME-friendly policy. In terms of 
organisation characteristics, central government and local government each account for 23% of 
respondents and over 60% of respondents are employed in large organisations. Just under half of 
respondents’ organisations are delivering services at national level, with 38% delivering services 
at local level and 13% at regional level. Finally, 40% of respondents’ organisations have a 
centralised procurement function and 77% manage procurement by category.  
Findings: extent of compliance  
Public buyers’ compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy is represented in Figure1. 
Evident from the distribution, only a small percentage of public buyers (2.5%) have an index 
score of 12, which signifies full policy compliance. All other public buyers exhibit varying 
degrees of compliance. The distribution of index scores is positively skewed (z = -2.08). The 
mean score is 8.08 (std. dev. 1.93) and the 95% confidence interval for the estimated population 
mean is between 7.90 and 8.26. The minimum index score is 3, indicating that all public buyers 
are adhering to at least two of the recommended measures. These findings suggest that 
institutional pressures to make public procurement more accessible to SMEs are deterministic to 
an extent. Based on their self-reported behaviours public buyers are responding to the agenda for 
SME-friendly procurement but in a way that represents a compromise on what is prescribed in 
policy. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction made earlier that total compliance is 
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likely to be difficult to achieve because of forces acting for and against SME-friendly 
procurement.  
Figure 1 Distribution of index scores (n=436) 
 
An analysis of compliance for each of the ten individual measures reveals wide variation. In the 
case of some measures a majority of public buyers are in compliance. For other measures the 
opposite is the case. At the upper end of compliance are measures advocating the use of open 
tendering procedures, allowing tenderers to self-declare their financial capacity and insurance 
cover, using relevant and proportionate qualification criteria, and providing feedback to 
unsuccessful tenderers. To illustrate, approximately 75% of public buyers are using open 
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tendering and over 80% are allowing tenderers to self-declare their financial capacity and 
insurance cover to undertake contracts. Similarly high rates of compliance are evident in the use 
of relevant and proportionate qualification criteria (86%) and the provision of feedback to 
unsuccessful tenderers (88%). On these five measures there is a close alignment between what is 
recommended in policy and what public buyers are claiming to do throughout the procurement 
process.   
Moderate to low levels of compliance are reported on other policy measures. Just under half of 
public buyers are using standard tender documents or showing flexibility over the type of proof 
of financial capacity that suppliers can furnish during a tender competition. Most notable, 
however, is the low level of compliance with measures designed to address the size disadvantage 
of SMEs when competing for public sector contracts. Only one in three public buyers are 
dividing contracts into lots or encouraging SME consortium bids. Hence, compliance is lowest 
on what are judged to be the two most important measures for facilitating SMEs. What the 
evidence suggests is that public buyers are complying with the more explicit and observable 
policy measures, such as use of open tendering and allowing firms to self-declare their financial 
capacity. These are also the measures that impose minimal time and resource costs on public 
buyers. In contrast, measures over which public buyers are able to exercise discretion, that are 
less visible in implementation terms, and which carry higher transaction costs are not being 
complied with. The division of contracts into lots, for example, requires knowledge of contract 
design as well as the ability to analyse the costs and benefits of using several small suppliers in 
preference to one large supplier.    
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Findings: predictors of compliance  
The second phase of the analysis involves testing predictors of compliance. Twelve variables are 
included as part of a predictive model. There is no evidence of multi-collinearity among the 
variables, as indicated by the high tolerance and low VIF values (table 3). The model is 
significant: F (19, 325) = 4.556, p <.001 and explains 16.4% of the variance in compliance 
(Adjusted R Square = 16.4 R Square = .210). Four of the twelve variables are statistically 
significant. Three of these relate to individual characteristics of the public buyer: involvement in 
procurement, policy familiarity, and perceived importance of SME access. Each has a positive 
impact on compliance. The fourth significant variable is organisation type. It is negatively 
related to policy compliance. None of the other eight variables are statistically significant. The 
standardised coefficients and significance levels for all twelve variables are listed in table 3.    
 
Indicated by effect size, involvement in procurement has the greatest positive impact on policy 
compliance. This is consistent with the prediction that increased involvement makes adherence 
to the institutional norms of public procurement more salient and career-relevant to public 
buyers. The assumption that compliance with policy presupposes a degree of familiarity is also 
supported. Likewise, public buyers that perceive public procurement as having a key role to play 
in supporting SMEs are more likely to comply with SME-friendly policy. Contrary to 
hypothesised predictions, neither experience, qualifications nor training are found to be 
significant in predicting compliance. The relevance of these attributes in contributing to effective 
procurement notwithstanding, they do not appear to act as enablers of SME-friendly policy 
compliance. Evidently, adhering to SME-friendly policy is less to do with skills and experience 
and more to do with awareness of what is expected and then having the commitment and interest 
to act on this awareness. Also inconsistent with predictions is the non-significant impact of 
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occupational group on compliance. Those outside the procurement occupational group are just as 
likely to comply with SME-friendly policy as those within it.    
 
Of the organisation variables, public sector organisation type emerges as significant. 
Specifically, semi-state/utility, local government, and education institutions are found to be 
significantly and negatively associated with compliance. The finding concerning semi-state and 
utility companies is not surprising. These organisations operate along quasi-commercial lines and 
their public buyers could well interpret SME-friendly policy as conflicting with commercial 
prerogatives. Moreover, semi-state and utility companies enjoy greater autonomy than other 
public sector organisations and, as a result, are less susceptible to institutional pressures for the 
facilitation of SMEs. The finding concerning local government is contrary to expectations. Based 
on foregoing research it was anticipated that operating at local level implied greater engagement 
with small, local suppliers and a concomitant receptiveness to SME-friendly procurement 
measures. The opposite is found to be the case. Related to this is the finding that policy 
compliance is not affected by the geographic level at which the organisation operates. 
Organisation size has no significant effect on policy compliance, which contradicts the 
assumption that formalised systems and a large resource base act as antecedents of better policy 
management. The structural configuration of procurement, centralised or decentralised, and 
management of procurement on a category basis are also non-significant. 
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Table 3 Predictors of policy compliance  
Model  Standardized t Sig. Collinearity Stats 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 
(Constant) 7.114 .703  10.120 .000   
Occupation group: manageriala .524 .310 .097 1.690 .092 .741 1.349 
Occupation group: executive officera -.161 .305 -.032 -.529 .597 .686 1.458 
Occupation group: profession-specifica -.095 .278 -.022 -.342 .732 .566 1.766 
Occupation group: othera -.608 .410 -.082 -1.485 .139 .799 1.252 
Involvement in procurement .555 .174 .203 3.190 .002 .599 1.669 
Experience in procurement -.102 .118 -.045 -.860 .390 .889 1.125 
Qualification in procurement .105 .263 .026 .398 .691 .585 1.709 
Undertook training in procurement .322 .222 .085 1.449 .148 .709 1.410 
Policy familiarity .699 .240 .167 2.912 .004 .741 1.350 
Perceived importance of SME access .267 .074 .183 3.593 .000 .933 1.072 
Level of service provision -.198 .150 -.097 -1.322 .187 .446 2.240 
Centralised procurement -.252 .223 -.064 -1.128 .260 .744 1.343 
Category managed .068 .227 .015 .298 .766 .918 1.089 
Organisation type: local governmentb -.750 .372 -.167 -2.016 .045 .355 2.819 
Organisation type: state agencyb -.284 .295 -.061 -.962 .337 .603 1.659 
Organisation type: semi-state/utilityb -1.855 .420 -.277 -4.413 .000 .618 1.617 
Organisation type: education institutionb -.840 .379 -.148 -2.218 .027 .544 1.840 
Organisation type: otherb -.240 .359 -.042 -.669 .504 .629 1.590 
Organisation size -.092 .119 -.045 -.771 .441 .723 1.383 
 
 
F = 4.556 
R Square = .210 
Adjusted R Square = .164 
 
 
a Occupation group ‘procurement’ is the reference category  
b Organisation type ‘central government’ is the reference category  
Reference categories were determined by highest frequency 
 
Discussion and implications  
This paper provides among the first comprehensive survey evidence of how public buyers have 
responded to SME-friendly policies in public procurement. In doing so it helps to move debate 
beyond policy rhetoric and towards the everyday reality of procurement as it concerns SMEs. 
What the findings reveal is a divide between official policy expectations and what public buyers 
are able or willing to do. Evidently, saying SMEs should be better facilitated when tendering for 
public sector contracts is easier than making it happen in practice. While it is clear that few 
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public buyers are complying with all policy recommendations, it is also clear that few are acting 
in open defiance of them. Instead, most seem to be pursuing the compromise approach to 
institutional compliance identified by Oliver (1991). This involves adhering to some measures 
but not to others. In some respects the overall response of the public buyer population is akin to a 
form of satisficing or what Van de Ven (1983) called ‘reasonable administrative behaviour’. 
What should be of concern to all public procurement stakeholders is that the two most important 
measures for helping SMEs overcome barriers to tendering – dividing contracts into lots and 
encouraging consortium bids – have the lowest levels of compliance among public buyers. If this 
trend continues, the result will be a truncated form of SME-friendly procurement. Efforts to 
increase SMEs’ participation and success in public sector tendering are likely to be diminished as 
a result. 
Are there possibilities for enhancing compliance with SME-friendly policy? The results of the 
predictive model indicate that there are. Three of the predictive factors identified as significant - 
involvement in procurement, policy familiarity, and perceived importance of SME access – can 
be managed with a view to increasing policy compliance. The significance of the first factor 
suggests the desirability of having more dedicated buyers with the time, resources and career 
interest to cope with the various demands and complexities of public procurement; something 
previously advocated by others (e.g. McCue and Gianakis, 2001). The tendency within public 
sector organisations is for procurement responsibility to be diffused across departments. 
Moreover, procurement generally forms an ancillary part of managers, administrators and 
professionals’ occupational roles: hence the quip ‘anyone can buy’. To move beyond this setup 
requires, in the first instance, senior management recognition of procurement as a discrete 
organisational function staffed by dedicated buyers. This implies a more prominent, clearly 
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defined role for procurement within the organisational hierarchy and a centrally controlled rather 
than devolved purchasing system. Case study evidence has shown that making this change can 
improve regulatory and policy compliance (Flynn et al., 2012). Integral to the success of this 
transition is maintaining open channels of communication with end users so that control and 
institutional compliance are not achieved at the expense of responsiveness to the purchasing 
needs of the organisation. It also requires that more public sector employees assume full-time 
procurement roles. The provision of training and education supports will need to form part of this 
process.  
Increasing policy familiarity and altering perceptions around the importance of SME access to 
public procurement are the other two levers to influence compliance. In the case of the former, 
the onus is on the state to ensure that all public buyers are made fully aware of their obligations 
and are up-to-date with SME-friendly policy initiatives. Lines of communication should be 
maintained through, for example, national e-procurement sites, used by the public buyer 
population. Where necessary, local or regional workshops could be organised to discuss the 
implications of SME-friendly policy and to clarify any issues public buyers might have about it. 
In the case of the latter, SME access to public procurement can assume greater priority status for 
public buyers if it is framed more in terms of a competitive imperative and less in terms of public 
sector organisations lending assistance to small firms. By re-framing the issue in this way and 
highlighting the competitive benefits of using SMEs as suppliers, including their agility, 
customer-responsiveness and competitive pricing (Woldesenbet et al., 2012), public buyers are 
more likely to accord greater weight to SME access. The desirability of public buyers having a 
larger and more diverse pool of suppliers from which to select is also part of changing the terms 
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of the debate (Caldwell et al., 2005). Put simply, public sector organisations’ self-interest in 
engaging with SMEs needs to be brought to the fore.   
As well as its contributions, acknowledgement needs to be made of this study’s limitations. For a 
start, not all potential predictors of policy compliance are explicated or empirically tested. For 
example, do public buyers perceive a conflict between simultaneous pressures for cost reduction 
and facilitating SMEs, and is this significant in explaining policy compliance? It is recommended 
that future survey-based research captures public buyers’ assessment of the forces acting for and 
against SME-friendly procurement and includes these as part of any predictive model. Secondly, 
the inquiry is confined to a single country. Whether the findings are reflective of public buyer 
behaviour in other countries is moot. There does appear to be a degree of consistency with the 
limited evidence that has been produced to date. Studies from the UK have provided qualitative 
evidence on a gap between policy expectation and actual SME-friendly procurement practice 
(Loader, 2007) while it is known that US federal contracting authorities often fail to meet their 
targets for awarding a certain percentage of contracts to SMEs (Clark and Moutray, 2004). More 
survey-based evidence from other countries is still needed. The compliance index developed here 
is a useful starting point for such investigation, allowing for some adjustments in respect of 
idiosyncratic national policies.  
Some other design issues in this study merit further comment. Public buyers self-reported 
behaviours are used to inform the research. As policy implementers public buyers should be the 
primary source of information on SME-friendly procurement practices. That said, solely relying 
on public buyers is not without its drawbacks and issues around social desirability bias and self-
selection bias cannot be discounted. Although, in the case of the latter, representative testing 
does indicate that survey respondents are typical of their population. To strengthen findings on 
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SME-friendly policy compliance, and in line with advice by Murray (2009), future research 
should aim to triangulate public buyers’ responses with SMEs’ reported experiences and/or use 
objective measures of SMEs’ participation and success rates in contract competitions. As the 
inquiry concerned issues around compliance, respondents were not asked to furnish any details 
that could identify them or their organisations. The downside to this approach is that multiple 
respondents from the same public sector organisation are not controlled for. The decision over 
whether respondents should be identified in any future research needs to be balanced with 
consideration of its likely effects on response rates and self-selection bias. Finally, our inquiry 
tests compliance approximately two and a half years after policy was officially adopted. It is 
possible that an even longer time period is required before practice fully adjusts to changes in the 
institutional ‘rules of the game’ governing public procurement. Researchers might, therefore, 
wish to consider using more longitudinal research designs.   
 
Amid growing academic interest in a SME-public procurement nexus, issues surrounding the 
implementation of SME-friendly policy have been largely overlooked. Our research shows that 
there is nothing inevitable about public buyers acting in accordance with policy 
recommendations. Cases of a divide between policy and practice have previously been identified 
in environmentally sustainable purchasing (Morgan, 2008; Thomson and Jackson, 2007) and in 
various domains outside public procurement (Nilsson et al., 2009; Randhawa and Marshall, 
2014). Now added to this body of scholarship is evidence of the same phenomenon in SME-
friendly procurement. Questions over what can be done to increase SME involvement in public 
procurement remain firmly on the political agenda. Among the most recent initiatives in the UK 
has come from the Labour Party, with its recommendation that 25% of the total value of 
government contracts should go to SMEs (Labour Party, 2013, pages 46-49). Precisely how this 
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is to be achieved is not altogether clear, however (Bennett, 2014). Moreover, UK businesses 
have previously stated that the priority for Government should be to make procurement more 
transparent, simple, and strategic rather than establishing a target market share for SMEs 
(Glover, 2008). Against this backdrop, the focus should be on ensuring existing SME-friendly 
policy is put into practice; admittedly, this is something which the Labour Party initiative also 
stresses. Otherwise, we are left with a situation where the same policies are re-packaged and 
recycled year-on-year, while the problem of SMEs’ under-representation in public procurement 
persists. 
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Appendix  
 
 Variable Measure  Scale 
1 Procurement 
experience 
Length of time involved in 
procurement 
Number of years  
2 Qualification in 
procurement 
Qualified in procurement or 
cognate area 
No  
Yes 
3 Trained in 
procurement 
Undertook procurement-
related training within last 3 
years 
No  
Yes 
4 Policy familiarity Familiar with content of 
Facilitating SME Access to 
Public Sector Contracts  
No 
Yes 
 
5 Importance of SME 
access 
Importance of SME access 
when procuring goods and 
services  
Not important [1] to highly 
important [5]   
6 Involvement in 
procurement 
Extent to which procurement 
constitutes work role 
Procurement forms no part of my 
role  
Procurement is a minor part of my 
role (less than one third of work 
time)  
Procurement is a major part of my 
role (more than one third of my 
work time but less than full-time) 
Sole role is to procure 
7 Occupation group Belong to which 
occupational group 
Procurement 
Managerial 
Administrative officer 
Profession-specific 
Other 
8 Public sector 
organisation type  
Employed in which type of 
public sector organisation 
Central government 
Local authority 
State agency 
Semi-state /utility  
Education institution 
Other 
9 Geographic scope of 
operations  
Delivers public services at 
what geographic level  
Local  
Regional 
National 
10 Organisation size Number of employees in the 
organisation 
1-9 
10-49 
50-249 
250+ 
11 Structural 
configuration of 
procurement function 
Procurement is centralised  No  
Yes 
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12 Operational 
management of 
procurement 
Procurement is category 
managed  
No 
Yes 
 
 
 
Respondent characteristics Respondent % 
Occupational group 
Procurement 
Manager/asst. principal/department head 
Executive officer/financial officer 
Profession-specific (incl. engineering, IT & education) 
Other (incl. facilities management & project management)  
 
33 
14.9 
17 
26.3 
8.8  
Involvement in procurement 
Procurement is a minor part of work role 
Procurement is a major part of work role 
Dedicated buyer 
 
44 
43.2 
12.8 
Procurement experience 
0-5 years 
6-10 years 
11+ years  
 
28.4 
29.6 
42  
Procurement qualification   
Yes   
No 
 
29.4 
70.6 
Procurement training 
Undertook procurement training within last 3 years 
Did not undertake procurement training within last 3 years  
 
53.7 
46.3 
Policy familiarity  
Familiar with SME-friendly procurement policy 
Not familiar with SME-friendly procurement policy  
 
71.9 
28.1 
Organisation type 
Central government 
Local government 
State agency 
Semi-state/utility 
Education institution 
Other (incl. external consultants) 
 
23.7 
23.7 
19.1 
7.4 
12.3 
13.8 
Geographic scope of operations 
Local level 
Regional level 
National level 
 
38.2 
13.4 
48.4 
Organisational size 
1-9 employees 
10-49 employees 
50-249 employees 
250+ employees 
 
6.5 
11.1 
20.7 
61.8 
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Structure of procurement function 
Centralised 
Decentralised 
 
40.2 
59.8 
Management of procurement function 
Category managed 
Not category managed 
 
77.7 
22.3 
 
 
 
 
 
